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Abstract
We consider a setting where citizens using a public facility (e.g., a hospital, a library
or a post-office) face an idiosyncratic private access cost (e.g. transportation) and, in
addition, must contribute to the costs of facility. We show that if the population is
uniformly spread over the entire real line, if the cost of a facility is independent of
location and access costs are linear with respect to distance, then the Rawlsian access
pricing (i) equates the total cost borne by every citizen; and (ii) is the unique cost
sharing solution that satisfies the “core property” of secession-proofness that amounts
to the voluntary participation principle under which no group of citizens should be
charged more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its own.
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1 Introduction
When citizens using a public facility (e.g. a hospital, a library or a post-office) face an
idiosyncratic private access cost (e.g. transportation) and must in addition contribute to the
fixed costs of the facility, two questions arise:
How does one characterize the optimal number and ”locations” of the facilities?
Should the contributions respond, ceteris paribus, to the differences in private cost?
As a simple illustration,1 we consider a population that consists of a continuum of citizens
uniformly distributed over the real line. Facilities can be located anywhere on the line at a
cost independent of location. All citizens face common private access costs proportional to
the distance to the chosen facility. For this version of the problem we provide an answer to
the two questions raised above. First, we show that there is a uniquely determined optimal
”density” of facilities, each serving a connected subset of citizens (called jurisdiction) of
the “optimal” size. Then we examine the implications of the core-like pricing principle,
called secession-proofness: no group of citizens S should bear a total cost higher than that
incurred by S had it acted on its own by creating a separate facility. In other words, the
pricing formula should guarantee the voluntary participation of any group of citizens. Our
main result asserts, somewhat surprisingly, that the Rawlsian pricing formula implementing
full cost equalization is the unique secession-proof allocation.2 Under the Rawlsian formula,
in each jurisdiction the contribution of a citizen is given by the difference between the average
total cost and her private access cost to the facility in the jurisdiction. The Rawlsian policies
are often advocated on the basis of justice considerations and sometimes on grounds of second-
best efficiency, e.g., under incomplete markets. Our result adds a stability dimension for the
rationale of the Rawlsian principle.
1In this paper we adopt the spatial interpretation of the horizontal differentiation setting.
2Le Breton et al. (2004) show that this result cannot be extended to societies whose population distribu-
tion has a finite support, where the Rawlsian principle and secession-proofness are, in general, inconsistent.
Le Breton et al. introduce the notion of approximate Rawlsian allocation, under which the proportion of
individuals whose cost burden is substantially lighter relative to the Rawlsian allocation is commensurably
small, and show that in large finite societies approximate Rawlsian allocations are secession-proof.
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As to the related literature, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) examine the existence of secession-
proof allocations in the case where the population is uniformly spread over a bounded interval
and the unique cost allocation available for each jurisdiction is the equal-share scheme, ac-
cording to which all citizens in the same jurisdiction make an identical contribution towards
the facility cost. Le Breton and Weber (2003) prove the existence and characterize secession-
proof cost allocations for a large class of absolutely continuous distributions. Haimanko et
al. (2004) establish the existence of secession-proof cost allocations in the general case of an
arbitrary probability measure with bounded support.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the model, state our
main result and provide some intuition for it. Section 3 contains the proof of the main result,
that relies on several claims and lemmas, proved in the Appendix.
2 The Model and the Result
We consider a population of citizens located on the real line <. The citizens’ distribution
is given by the Lebesgue measure λ over <. The population is partitioned in several groups
(jurisdictions) each providing its members with an access to its own facility. The cost of each
facility is independent of the jurisdiction and is given by a positive number g.3 A citizen
with location at t (for simplicity, labelled t henceforth), who resides in a jurisdiction whose
facility location is at l, faces a transportation cost d(t, l) = |t− l|.4
Let S be a bounded subset of < with a positive measure (not necessarily an interval) that
defines a jurisdiction. An S−cost allocation is a specification of the individual contributions
to the fixed cost of the facility, say x(t) for citizen(s) located at t. We impose the budget-
balancedness condition, i.e., the total contribution of all members of S is equal to the cost
of the facility:
∫
S
x(t)dt = g.
3This assumption can be weakened to include the case where the facility costs are jurisdiction-dependent
and are given by g(S) = g + αλ(S), where g and α are positive constants.
4Again, this can be easily generalized to cover the case where the transportation cost is a continuous and
convex function of the distance.
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A solution to the allocation problem for the entire population consists of a set of located
facilities, jurisdictions (a comprehensive assignment of citizens to facilities), and a cost allo-
cation for every jurisdiction. Since in our set-up every citizen will be assigned to the closest
facility, a solution can be described by the pair (P, x), where P is a partition of <, and
x determines a cost allocation for every jurisdiction in P . Our goal is to study solutions
endowed with a secession-proofness property,5 under which the formation of jurisdictions
and the choice of cost allocations within each of them rules out the emergence of a poten-
tially seceding group (prone to secession), that can benefit all its members. To proceed with
the formal definition, denote by D(S) the minimal aggregate transportation cost within S:
D(S) = inf l∈<
∫
S
d(t, l)dt. It is easy to see that the minimum is attained when l = m(S),
where m(S) is a median of the set S. This observation guarantees that every jurisdiction
will locate its facility at a median. Therefore, we define:
Definition: Given a solution (P, x), the group S is prone to secession if∫
S
(d(t,m(S(t))) + x(t))dt > D(S) + g,
where S(t) is a jurisdiction in P that contains t.
If no group is prone to secession, then the pair (P, x) is called secession-proof; if there
is no ambiguity we drop the first argument of the pair and simply refer to a secession-proof
cost allocation.
The crucial role in our discussion will be played by the Rawlsian S-cost allocation xRS
which displays complete equalization by making the sum of transportation costs and con-
tribution towards the cost of the facility identical for all members of S. Obviously, this
allocation minimizes the highest individual cost over S. Since the sum of aggregate trans-
portation costs and fixed facility cost faced by S isD(S)+g, the contribution of an individual
5The concept of secession-proofness introduced here is closely related to the notion of the core of a
game with coalition structure (Aumann and Dre`ze (1974)), whose set of players is <, and the set of feasible
outcomes of a coalition S is given by the set of all S-cost allocations. Since we do not use the game-theoretical
formalism here, we formulate our results without referring to it.
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t ∈ S is:
xSR(t) =
D(S) + g
λ(S)
− d(t,m(S)) a.e. on S,
where λ(S) is the measure of S. A cost allocation x attached to the partition P is called
Rawlsian and is denoted xPR when the cost allocation is Rawlsian for every jurisdiction in P .
We are now in position to state our main result. Let s∗ ≡ 2√g and P ∗ be a partition of
< into equal intervals of size s∗. We show that the Rawlsian allocation associated with the
partition P ∗, denoted simply by x∗R, is the unique
6 secession-proof allocation.
Theorem: A pair (P, x), where P is a partition of < and x is a P -cost allocation, is secession-
proof if and only if P = P ∗ and x = x∗R.
In our proof we utilize the concept of an efficient partition that minimizes the total
cost of facilities and access over all jurisdictions and is thus Pareto efficient for the entire
population. However, since the total cost is infinite, an operational definition invokes cost
minimization over bounded sets.
Definition: A partition P of < is called efficient if and only if total costs over any finite
union of jurisdictions in P are minimal.
A full characterization of efficient partitions is given by:
Lemma 1: A partition P of < is efficient if and only if every jurisdiction S ∈ P is an
interval of length s∗.
In our framework efficiency is implied by secession-proofness, namely, if a solution (P, x)
is secession-proof, then the partition P is efficient.
The logic of the proof of the theorem is simple. First, secession-proofness of the Rawlsian
allocation x∗R associated with the efficient partition P
∗ follows from the fact that no juris-
diction of a non-optimal size could guarantee each of its members a lesser cost burden than
6A partition of the real line into intervals of size s∗ is only unique up to translations. But if one endpoint
of any interval in the partition is fixed, the uniqueness is strict.
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that assigned by the optimal jurisdiction. Second, if there exists a secession-proof allocation
x which is not Rawlsian, then there exists a set of positive measure, over which individuals
contribute finitely less on average under x than under the Rawlsian allocation. The next step
is to show the existence of a “small” interval [a − l, a) of “subsidized” individuals, whose
endpoint, say, a, is also an endpoint of an existing jurisdiction.7The proof then proceeds
by contradiction. Consider the interval of optimal size [a − s∗, a). By leaving out a set of
“subsidized’ individuals [a− l, a) under x, the remaining group [a−s∗, a− l) would be better
off on its own rather than under the allocation x. Indeed, since s∗ is the optimal jurisdiction
size, a tiny shrinkage of the optimal jurisdiction at the boundary has a second-order has a
second-order effect in raising the average contribution. However, the savings from leaving
out “free riders” are of the first order, and, accordingly, the interval [a − s∗, a − l) is prone
to secession when l is sufficiently small. The concluding part of the proof formalizes that
intuition by comparing the total costs over a finite but large interval of the size (N +1)s∗− l
under x and under a partition into N jurisdictions of equal size close (but not equal) to s∗.
3 Proof of the theorem
Part “if”. Let us prove that the solution (P ∗, x∗R) is secession-proof. As shown in the
proof of Lemma 1, the total cost for any jurisdiction S, if it secedes, is no less than g+ (λ(S))
2
4
,
entailing a cost per citizen no less than g
λ(S)
+ λ(S)
4
. This quantity is minimized at λ(S) = 2
√
g,
yielding the minimal value of
√
g. However, given (P ∗, x∗R), the total contribution of members
of S is λ(S)
√
g, thus leaving no room for beneficial secession by any S.
Part “only if”. Let us demonstrate that the Rawlsian allocation x∗R in the infinite
society < is the (essentially) unique secession-proof cost allocation. Assume that there exists
another secession-proof cost allocation y in < that differs from x∗R on a set of positive measure.
Since the per capita total cost in < determined through allocation x is √g, there is a group
7This step adds to the length of the proof. The step, however, would be redundant if a continuity of cost
allocations is imposed.
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S with λ(S) > 0, such that
y(t)+ | t−m(S(t)) |< √g
for all t ∈ S. Without loss of generality, we can assume that S lies in the interior of a a
jurisdiction (t′, t′ + s∗) in P . We then show that there exists an interval I with a positive
measure and a positive constant δ such that the average contribution of members of I assigned
by the allocation y is by, at least, δ below the Rawlsian level, i.e.,∫
I
(y(t)dt+ | t−m(S(t)) |) dt < (√g − δ)λ(I).
To proceed, we will use the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2: Let z be a secession-proof allocation associated with partition P , δ > 0 and
S ⊂ O where O is an open set. Assume that z(t) < √g − δ a.e. on S. Then there
exists a finite family of pairwise disjoint intervals I = {I1, . . . , Im} with Ii ⊆ O for all
Ii ∈ I and λ(
⋃
Ii∈I Ii) ≥
λ(S)
2
such that∫
Ii
z(t)dt <
∫
Ii
(
xRL(t)+ | t−m(S(t)) |
)
dt− δ
2
λ(Ii) for every Ii ∈ I.
Lemma 3 is known as the Lusin theorem (Billingsley (1995), Result 17.10, p. 230):
Lemma 3: Let A be a bounded measurable subset of < and h be a measurable function on
A. Then for every ε > 0 there exists a compact set Cε ⊆ A with λ(C˜ε) ≥ λ(A)− ε and
on which h is continuous.
By Lemma 3, there exists a compact set C ⊆ S with λ(C) ≥ λ(S)
2
, such that the function
u(t) = y(t)+ | t−m(S(t)) |
is continuous on C. Thus, there exists δ > 0 such that u(t) <
√
g − δ for all t ∈ C. By
applying Lemma 2 to the set C, we obtain the existence of an interval I∗ = [t¯, t¯ + l) in the
interior of a jurisdiction J = [t′, t′ + s∗) in P with l > λ(S)
4m
, where m is a finite integer, and∫
I∗ u(t)dt
λ(I∗)
<
√
g − δ
2
.
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Then ∫
J\I∗ u(t)dt
λ(J\I∗) >
2g − λ(I∗)(√g − δ
2
)
s∗ − λ(I∗) =
√
g + γ, where γ =
λ(I∗) δ
2
s∗ − λ(I∗) > 0.
Obviously,
max
[∫
t¯−t′ u(t)dt
t¯− t′ ,
∫
t′+s∗−t¯−l u(t)dt
t′ + s∗ − t¯− l
]
>
√
g + γ.
Assume, without loss of generality, that the maximum above is attained for the interval
[t′, t¯). Take a positive integer N and the interval A = [t′ −Ns∗, t¯). Consider a partition PA
of A into N jurisdictions of equal size s∗ + ∆t
N
, where ∆t ≡ t − t′. Then PA generates the
total cost c(PA) over A, where
c(PA) = N(g +
1
4
(s∗ +
∆t
N
)2) = 2Ng +
√
g∆t+
(∆t)2
4N
.
On the other hand, the total contribution of citizens of A under y satisfies:∫
A
u(t)dt > 2Ng + (
√
g + γ)∆t.
It is easy to verify that the last expression exceeds c(PA)) provided γ >
∆t
4N
, i.e., N is suffi-
ciently large. This implies that, relatively to the allocation y, the interval A can guarantee
its citizens a lower total contribution. Thus, there exists a jurisdiction S in PA, that can
make each of its members better off with respect to y. Then S is prone to secession, a
contradiction to the assumed secession-proofness of y.2
4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let P be an efficient partition. Then every individual is assigned
to her closest facility, which implies that every jurisdiction in P is an interval. Let us
demonstrate that all jurisdictions are of the same length. Note that the value of D(S) when
S is an interval of size s, is given by
∫
S
| t−m(S) | dt = s2
4
. Let S and S ′ be two adjacent
intervals in P and of the length s and s′, respectively. Since P is efficient, D(S) +D(S ′) is
minimal among all possible partitions of S∪S ′ into two intervals, yielding s2+(s′)2 ≤ x2+y2
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for all nonnegative numbers x, y satisfying x+y = s+s′. Then the convexity of the function
x2 + y2 immediately implies s = s′.
To show that the partition P that consists of intervals of the length s∗ is efficient, it
suffices to demonstrate that every partition P ′ into equal intervals of length s 6= s∗ is in-
efficient. Consider the case where s > s∗ (the case s < s∗ is treated in a similar manner).
Since s
s∗ > 1, there exists a rational number
m
n
such that s
s∗ >
m
n
> 1. Thus, there exists s˜
with s > s˜ > s∗ such that s˜m = sn. Consider partition P˜ obtained by replacing n adjacent
intervals of length s in P ′ by m adjacent intervals of length s˜. Put L = s˜m = sn. Since
the function f(t) is increasing for t ≥ s∗, and s > s˜ > s∗, it follows that Lf(s˜) < Lf(s).
However, this inequality is equivalent to mg +m s˜
2
4
< ng + n s
2
4
. Since partitions P ′ and P˜
differ only over the finite union of jurisdictions in P , the definition of an efficient partition
immediately implies than only P is efficient. 2
Before proceeding with the proof of Lemma 2, we use two claims. The first (from basic
measure theory) relies on the regularity of the Lebesgue measure (Billingsley (1995), Theorem
12.3, p.174):
Claim 1: Let S be a bounded measurable subset of <. Then for every ε > 0 there exist a
closed set Kε and an open set Oε such that Kε ⊆ S ⊆ Oε and λ(Oε \Kε) < ε.
The next claim states the property of essential boundedness of secession-proof allocations
in a multi-jurisdictional framework.
Claim 2: Let x be a secession-proof allocation i associated with a partition P into, at least,
two jurisdictions. Then x(t) ≤ 2s∗ almost everywhere on <.
Proof: Let x be a secession-proof allocation associated with a partition P that consists of
more than one jurisdiction. Denote S ≡ ({t ∈ < : x(t)+ | t−m(S(t)) |> 2s∗}). We shall
show that λ(S) = 0. Suppose, to the contrary, that λ (S) > 0. Let S1, S2 be two adjacent
jurisdictions in partition P with λ(S ′) > 0, where S ′ = S2 ∩ S. Denote T ≡ S1 ∪ S ′ and
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consider the T -cost allocation y that coincides with x on S1 and is equal to zero over S
′. We
have
D(T )+g =
∫
T
(y(t)+ | t−m(T ) |)dt ≤
∫
T
(y(t)+ | t−m(S1) |)dt =
∫
S1
x(t)dt+
∫
T
| t−m((S1) | dt.
Since | t−m(S1) |< 2s∗ < x(t)+ | t−m(S2) | for all t ∈ S ′, it follows that∫
S′
| t−m((S1) | dt <
∫
S′
(x(t)+ | t−m(S2) |)dt.
Thus,
D(T )+g <
∫
T
x(t)dt+
∫
S1
| t−m((S1) | dt+
∫
S′
| t−m((S2) | dt =
∫
T
(x(t)+ | t−m(S(t)) |)dt.
That is, T is prone to secession, contradicting secession-proofness of x. 2
Proof of Lemma 2: Let z be a secession-proof allocation and let S ⊂ O be such that
z(t) <
√
g − δ a.e. on S, where δ is a positive number. Choose η such that 0 < η < δ
8
√
g
.
Claim 1 implies that there exists a compact subset K of S such that λ (K) > 3
4
λ(S) and an
open set Oη with O ⊇ Oη ⊇ S such that λ (Oη\K) ≤ ηλ (K).
For every t ∈ K, let I(t) ⊂ Oη be an open interval that contains t. Since K is compact,
the cover {I(t)}t∈K admits a finite subcover I˜. We may assume, without loss of generality,
that all intervals in I˜ are pairwise disjoint, and, moreover, that Oη consists only of elements
of I˜. Denote by I = {I1, . . . , Im} the following subset of I˜:
I = {Ii ∈ I˜|λ (K
c ∩ Ii)
λ (Ii)
≤ 5η}.
Thus, we have ∑
Ii∈I˜
λ (Kc ∩ Ii) = λ (Oη\K) ≤ ηλ (K) < ηλ(S).
But ∑
Ii∈I˜
λ (Kc ∩ Ii) =
∑
Ii∈I
λ (Kc ∩ Ii) +
∑
Ii 6∈I
λ (Kc ∩ Ii) > 5η
∑
Ii 6∈I
λ (Ii) .
10
Thus,
λ(
⋃
Ii 6∈I
Ii) <
λ(S)
5
<
4
15
λ(K), and (λ(
⋃
Ii∈I
Ii)) >
11
15
λ(K) >
λ(S)
2
.
Let I =
⋃
Ii∈I . We have∫
I
z(t)dt =
∫
K∩I
z(t)dt+
∫
Kc∩I
z(t)dt, where
∫
K∩I
z(t)dt < λ(I)(
√
g − δ).
By Claim 2, z(t) < 2s∗ = 4
√
g almost everywhere on <, yielding ∫
Kc∩I z(t)dt ≤ 4
√
gηλ(I).
But η < δ
8
√
g
implies
∫
I
z(t)dt < λ(I)(
√
g − δ
2
), which completes the proof of the lemma. 2
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